



A Secured Data sharing among Vehicles to Keep Track of Road Conditions

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ABSTRACT: The main objective is to improve the travel efficiency and safety of transportation system and it represents the design of a road side authority, such that it needs to monitor real-time road conditions with the help of a cloud server so that it could make sound responses to emergency cases timely. Vehicles on site are able to report the information to a cloud server engaged by the authority when they detect some bad road conditions, for example some geologic hazard or accidents. The main goal is to provide authorized reporting of the vehicles. A vehicle can collect the real time road condition information and encrypt it with the root authority's public key, its secret key and the token issued by the administrative RU and the cloud server is engaged to perform much of the monitoring work. The entities in RCoM system such as sub-authorities, vehicles and roadside units are recognized with their identities.

KEYWORDS: Data privacy, vehicular ad hoc network, cloud computing, authentication.

I. INTRODUCTION

In real world application scenario, the road side authority may need to monitor real time road conditions so that it could respond quickly in emergency cases. Each vehicle with an embedded on-board unit is able to collect and communicate the current road/traffic information with the help of distributed road side unit. When T (toe) or more road condition reports for the same location are received, where T denotes the threshold in the monitoring system, the root authority considers it as an emergency case and then makes response. Mainly, the vehicles have to be authorized by some roadside unit. To guarantee the privacy against the cloud server, the road condition information should be reported in cipher text format. The cloud server and authority should be able to validate the report source. So in this way, every nearby recipient vehicle would be able to get better awareness of driving environment and change driving plan if needed. However this approach requires root authority to equip with powerful computing and storage resources, which would bring unaffordable costs to RA.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Title: Efficient Hierarchical Identity-Based Signature with Batch Verification for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System

Author: Debiao He, Neeraj Kumar, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, and Wei Wu

- They proposed an efficient TLHIBS scheme and show it is provably secure and can meet summarized security requirements.

Title: How to Protect ADS-B: Confidentiality Framework and Efficient Realization Based on Staged Identity-Based Encryption

Author: JoonsangBaek, EmanHableel, Young-Ji Byon, Duncan S. Wong, Kitae Jang, and Hwasoo Yeo

- The author proposes a modified version which they call a "Staged Identity-Based Encryption (SIBE)" scheme, to address the aforementioned challenges of providing ADS-B with confidentiality



SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE




Figure:3.1

The system architecture consists of five types of entities, that is, a root authority (RA), many sub-authorities (SAs), many roadside units (RUs), a cloud server, and many vehicles. As in VANET, RA, SAs and RUs are the trusted participants. In real-world applications, RA can be the Department of Transportation. The goal of RA is to monitor the real-time road conditions with the help of a cloud server, so that it could make timely response to emergency cases. The cloud server is maintained by some cloud service provider (CSP), which has significant computing and storage resources, and provides on-the-move access to outsourced data (i.e., road condition information) to end users. In RCoM, the cloud server is a curious entity, which is engaged by RA to maintain and process all road information collected by vehicles.

III. MODULE SETS

Setup(1^K)->(par, msk): On input 1^K where k is a security parameter, the RCoM system setup algorithm, which is run by the root authority RA, generates the public parameter par for the system and a master secret key msk for itself. **SAdlg(par, msk; SA_i)** ->ssk_i: On input the public parameter par, the master secret key msk and the identity of some sub-authority SA_i, the delegation algorithm, which is run by RA, generates a secret key ssk_i for SA_i. Sub-authority SA_i should be able to validate ssk_i before accepting it as secret key. **VHreg(par, SA_i, ssk_i, V_j)** ->vsk_j: On input the public parameter par, the identity SA_i and secret key ssk_i of some sub-authority, and the identity of some vehicle V_j, the vehicle registration algorithm, which is run by SA_i, generates a secret key vsk_j for V_j. Vehicle V_j should be able to validate vsk_j before accepting it as secret key. **RUreg(par, SA_i, ssk_i, RU_l)** ->rsk_l: On input the public parameter par, the identity SA_i and secret key ssk_i of some sub-authority, and the identity of some roadside unit RU_l, the roadside unit registration algorithm, which is run by SA_i, generates a secret key rsk_l for RU_l. Roadside unit RU_l should be able to validate rsk_l before accepting it as secret key. **TKdis(par, (SA_i, V_j, vsk_j), (SA_l, RU_l, rsk_l))** ->T₁ / L: On input the public parameter par, the token distribution protocol, which is jointly run by vehicle V_j and roadside unit RU_l with (SA_i, vsk_j) and (SA_l, rsk_l), respectively, outputs an authentication tuple T₁ including a token theta_(l) if both sides are honest, or L otherwise. Here, SA_i and SA_l denote the administrative sub-authorities of V_j and RU_l, respectively. **RCrep(par, vsk_j, T₁, RU_l, I)** -> (U, W): On input the public parameter par, the secret key vsk_j of vehicle V_j, an authentication tuple T₁, a roadside unit identity RU_l and some road condition information I, the road condition report algorithm, which is run by vehicle V_j, outputs a ciphertext U and a tuple W. **CLpro(par, U, W)** ->{0, 1}: On input the public parameter par and a pair of (U, W), the cloud processing algorithm, which is run by the cloud server, outputs “1” if the pair (U, W) can be inserted into some group; otherwise it outputs “0”. **RApro(par, msk, U, W)** -> (RU_l, I): On input the public parameter par, the master secret key msk and a pair of (U, W), the RA processing algorithm, which is run by the root authority, outputs a decrypted pair of (RU_l, I).



IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Step 1:

The screenshot shows a login form titled "Login Page". It contains two input fields: "Username" and "Password". Below these fields is a red "SUBMIT" button. At the bottom of the form, there is a link that says "Not registered yet? Register HERE".

Login from app

Step 2:

The screenshot shows a registration form titled "Registration Page". It contains several input fields: "Name", "Email Address", "Mobile", "Password", and "Confirm Password". There is also a "Gender" section with radio buttons for "Male" and "Female". Below the form is a red "SUBMIT" button.

Registration



Step 3:



User homepage and updating GPS location

Step 4:




GPS tracker

Step 5:



Authority home


Step 6:



Add Sub-authority



Step 7:



Add RSU

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The performance of the Setup, SAdlg, VHreg and RUreg algorithms are shown in Figure 1. The evaluation shows that the Setup algorithm can be completed in less than 20 msec, which is mainly determined by two exponentiations in G. For a delegation, RA can generate a secret key sski for some sub-authority SA_i in roughly 7 msec, whereas SA_i is able to validate sski with less than 8 msec. These two procedures are presented by DelGen and DelVrf in the figure. The vehicle registration enjoys the comparable performance of the roadside unit registration, that is, the secret keys vskj and rskl can be generated by sub-authorities in roughly the same time, and the verification at respective sides of vehicle and roadside unit also takes the similar time. Figure 2 plots the performance of the token distribution TKdis protocol, and the RCrep and RApr algorithms. The experiment results are shown in Figure 3, which demonstrate that the performance linearly determined by the number of equivalence classes at the cloud server side. It is easy to see that the average execution time of comparing with a single equivalence class is roughly 4 msec.




Fig.1. Performance evaluation of the Setup, SAdlg, VHreg and RUreg algorithms.




Fig.2 Performance evaluation of the TKdis protocol, and the RCrep and RApr algorithms.




Fig. 3. : Performance evaluation of the CLpro algorithm.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this article, we considered the problem of a secured data sharing among vehicles to keep track of road condition. There are two levels of authorities such that the root authority delegates sub authorities to perform registration for vehicles and RUs. RA monitors real-time road conditions through a third party intermediary, that is, vehicles report the detected road conditions to the cloud server for verification and processing, in this way, only the valid information sent from legitimate vehicles will be picked out for RA to make response. To protect the privacy against the cloud server, the road condition report should be uploaded in cipher text format, which brings another challenge for the cloud server to distinguish the same road condition for the same place from lots of reports. In response to these functionalities and security and privacy requirements, we presented an efficient scheme and compared it with related techniques. Through extensive theoretical and experimental analyses, we demonstrate that the proposed RCoM scheme is practical in application settings and we can increase the performance of privacy requirements.

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