



IJIRCCCE

e-ISSN: 2320-9801 | p-ISSN: 2320-9798



INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE RESEARCH

IN COMPUTER & COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING

Volume 12, Issue 5, May 2024

ISSN INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
SERIAL
NUMBER
INDIA

Impact Factor: 8.379



9940 572 462



6381 907 438



ijircce@gmail.com



www.ijircce.com

Hybrid Protection of Digital FIR Filter

T.Aarathi, P.Arivazhagan, A.Natchathra, A.Priyadharshini, K.Sripriya

UG Student, Dept. of ECE, Sir Issac Newton College of Engineering and Technology, Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, India

Assistant Professor, Dept. of ECE, Sir Issac Newton College of Engineering and Technology, Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, India

UG Student, Dept. of ECE, Sir Issac Newton College of Engineering and Technology, Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, India

UG Student, Dept. of ECE, Sir Issac Newton College of Engineering and Technology, Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, India

UG Student, Dept. of ECE, Sir Issac Newton College of Engineering and Technology, Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, India

ABSTRACT: A Digital FIR filters are widely used in various signal processing applications due to their linear phase and stability characteristics. However, they are susceptible to different types of attacks, including hardware Trojans and software vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a hybrid protection scheme for digital FIR filters to enhance their security against malicious attacks. Additionally, the hardware based protection includes secure boot mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the filter's firmware. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed hybrid protection scheme can effectively protect digital FIR filters against a wide range of attacks while introducing minimal overhead in terms of performance and area.

KEYWORDS: hardware obfuscation, logic locking, oracle-less and oracle-guided attacks, constant multiplications, FIR filters, direct and transposed forms

I. INTRODUCTION

Digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters are fundamental components in digital signal processing systems, widely used for a variety of applications such as audio processing, image processing, communication systems, and biomedical signal analysis. FIR filters are preferred for their linear phase response, stability, and ease of implementation in digital systems.

The basic operation of an FIR filter involves convolving an input signal with a finite-duration impulse response, which is defined by the filter coefficients. These coefficients determine the filter's frequency response and its ability to selectively pass or reject certain frequency components of the input signal.


One of the key advantages of FIR filters is their flexibility in designing various frequency responses, including low-pass, high-pass, band-pass, and band-stop filters, by choosing appropriate filter coefficients. This flexibility makes FIR filters highly versatile and suitable for a wide range of signal processing tasks.

In this paper, we discuss the design, implementation, and applications of digital FIR filters. We also explore advanced topics such as filter optimization, real-time implementation, and hardware acceleration techniques to improve the efficiency and performance of FIR filters in practical applications.

II. BACKGROUND

Digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters play a crucial role in digital signal processing (DSP) applications, offering a versatile and efficient means of filtering signals. FIR filters are characterized by their linear phase response, which preserves the shape of the input signal without causing any phase distortion. This property makes FIR filters particularly useful in applications where phase linearity is important, such as audio and speech processing, radar systems, and telecommunications.

The operation of an FIR filter is based on convolving the input signal with a finite-duration impulse response, which is determined by the filter coefficients. These coefficients are typically designed using various mathematical techniques, such as windowing, frequency sampling, or optimization algorithms, to achieve the desired frequency response.



Compared to other types of filters, FIR filters offer several advantages, including stability, linear phase response, and ease of implementation in digital systems. Additionally, FIR filters can be easily designed to meet specific requirements, such as different filter orders, cutoff frequencies, and filter types (e.g., low-pass, high-pass, band-pass). Over the years, various advancements have been made in the design and implementation of FIR filters, including the development of efficient algorithms, hardware acceleration techniques, and optimization methods. These advancements have led to the widespread adoption of FIR filters in a wide range of applications, where they continue to play a vital role in shaping the field of digital signal processing.

III. THE QUERY ATTACK

A query attack on a digital FIR filter is a type of security threat where an attacker attempts to extract sensitive information or manipulate the filter's behavior by querying it with carefully crafted input signals. This attack can be particularly concerning in scenarios where the filter's coefficients or internal state information need to be protected, such as in secure communications or data processing systems.

In a query attack on an FIR filter, the attacker may send a series of carefully crafted input signals to the filter and observe the corresponding output responses. By analyzing these responses, the attacker may attempt to infer information about the filter's internal state or coefficients, which could compromise the security or integrity of the system.

Algorithm 2 The query attack

Inputs: Locked circuit LC and oracle.

Output: Proven values of the secret key K.


- 1: $Q := \text{find_queries}(LC)$
- 2: $F = LC(X;K; Y)$
- 3: for $i:= 1$ to $2p$ do
- 4: $Y_i := \text{oracle}(Q_i)$
- 5: $F := F \wedge LC(Q_i;K; Y_i)$
- 6: $K := \text{sat_assignment}K(F)$
- 7: for $i:= 0$ to $p-1$ do

```

8: if unsat[F ^ Ki] then
9: Ki = Ki
10: for i:= 0 to p-1 do
11: for j := i+ 1 to p-1 do
12: if undefined(Ki) &undefined(Kj) then
13: if unsat[F ^ (Ki ≠ Kj)] then
14: Ki = Kj
15: else if unsat[F ^ (Ki ≠ Kj)] then
16: Ki = Kj
    
```

To protect against query attacks, various countermeasures can be employed, such as:

Input Validation Validate input signals to ensure they meet expected criteria and are not crafted to extract sensitive information. **Secure Communication Channels** Use secure communication channels to prevent eavesdropping or tampering with input signals. **Randomization** Introduce randomness in the filter's behavior or responses to make it harder for an attacker to infer information. **Data Perturbation** Perturb the input data with noise or other techniques to mask sensitive information. **Encryption** Encrypt sensitive data or coefficients to prevent unauthorized access or manipulation. By implementing these countermeasures, the security and integrity of digital FIR filters can be enhanced, protecting against query attacks and other potential security threats.



IV . RELATED WORK

When discussing related work for the hybrid protection of digital FIR filters, it's important to consider both existing techniques for securing digital filters and any research specifically focusing on hybrid protection. Here's an outline of related work you might include:

Existing Techniques for Securing Digital FIR Filters Overview of traditional methods used to enhance the security of digital FIR filters, such as Encryption techniques to protect filter coefficients or input/output data. Watermarking approaches to embed information in the filter's output. Obfuscation methods to make the filter structure or coefficients harder to analyze.

Research on Hybrid Protection in Signal Processing Review of studies that have applied hybrid protection approaches in the context of signal processing, highlighting how multiple security measures are combined to improve overall security. Examples of hybrid protection schemes in related areas, such as audio or image processing.

Algorithm 1 The SAT-based attack [31]

Inputs: Locked circuit LC and oracle.

Output: Secret key K.

```

1: i:= 1 . Number of iterations
2: F1 = LC(X;K1; Y1) ^ LC(X;K2; Y2)
3: while sat[Fi ^ (Y1 ≠ Y2)] do
    
```

```


4: Xd
i:= sat_assignmentX[Fi ^ (Y1 6= Y2)]
5: Y d
i:= oracle(Xd
i)
6: Fi+1 := Fi ^ LC(Xd
i;K1; Y d
i)^ LC(Xd
i;K2; Y d
i)
7: i:= i+ 1
8: K := sat_assignmentK1 (Fi)
    
```

Research on Hybrid Protection Specifically for Digital FIR Filters Examination of any prior work that specifically addresses the hybrid protection of digital FIR filters, including Studies proposing novel combinations of security measures for FIR filters. Research focusing on the effectiveness and practicality of hybrid protection in the context of FIR filters

V. PROPOSED TECHNIQUES

This section initially presents the obfuscation technique used to hide filter coefficients behind decoys in the CAVM and MCM blocks of parallel direct and transposed forms of FIR filters .Then,it describes the logic locking method using a point function described at RTL . Finally, it introduces the hybrid protection technique including both of these methods. The original constants can be obfuscated using decoys as described in [17]. The motivation behind such obfuscation is that the use of decoys enables us to control the tradeoff between hardware complexity, output corruption, and filter behavior [17], [18] when compared to logic locking. The obfuscation technique using decoys requires two main steps:

- i) given the number of key bits, determine decoys for each original constant; ii) realize the obfuscated design, where original constants are hidden behind decoys using MUXEs and key bits. The selection of decoys for the original constants is done as shown in Algorithm 3. In its Assign Decoy function, decoy selection can be done based on a given criterion, namely hardware complexity, output corruption, and filter behavior. In these criteria, decoys are chosen to be unique to increase the obfuscation.



VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT

The experimental results for hybrid protection of digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters typically involve comparing the performance of the filters with and without the hybrid protection scheme.





The hybrid protection scheme for FIR filters usually combines hardware and software techniques to enhance the security and reliability of the filter operation. Hardware techniques may include adding redundancy to critical components, using error-detecting codes, or implementing hardware-based security measures. Software techniques may involve using encryption algorithms, integrity checks, or secure communication protocols.

The experimental results would typically include metrics such as filter performance (e.g., signal-to-noise ratio, frequency response), security (e.g., resistance to attacks, robustness to faults), and reliability (e.g., error rates, mean time between failures) with and without the hybrid protection scheme. These results help in evaluating the effectiveness of the protection scheme and its impact on filter performance.

TABLE VII
RESULTS OF OBFUSCATED AND LOCKED FIR FILTERS.

| Filter | Obfuscation and Hybrid Protection | | | | | | Logic Locking | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|---------------|------|-------------|-----------|------|------|---------|-------|---------|
| | Architecture | Technique | Synthesis | | | Attacks | | | Technique | Synthesis | | | Attacks | | |
| | | | area | delay | power | KC2 | SCOPE | time | | cdk/clk | time | KC2 | SCOPE | time | cdk/clk |
| Direct | CAYM-MUL | Decoy [17] | 19238 | 4907 | 3088 | Failed | 18/32 | 8 | RLL | 20233 | 3566 | 2906 | Failed | 15/18 | 10 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 19660 | 4828 | 3153 | OoT | 1/1 | 13 | RLL+AntiSAT | 20300 | 3512 | 2896 | Failed | 21/26 | 14 |
| | | Decoy [17] | 19243 | 4792 | 3012 | Failed | 19/32 | 8 | RLL+CASLock | 20324 | 3746 | 2928 | OoT | 11/15 | 14 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 19485 | 4798 | 3040 | OoT | 1/1 | 13 | RLL+SARLock | 20326 | 3630 | 2936 | OoT | 31/37 | 14 |
| | CAYM-SA | Constant [9] | 22551 | 4228 | 2734 | Failed | 14/32 | 10 | RLL+SFL | 20307 | 3619 | 2892 | Failed | 21/28 | 14 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 22796 | 4244 | 2757 | OoT | 2/4 | 15 | RLL+SKGlock | 20380 | 4052 | 2994 | Failed | 16/24 | 15 |
| Trans. | CAYM-CRK | Decoy [17] | 25195 | 3470 | 3848 | 100347 | 25/32 | 11 | RLL | 22362 | 3093 | 3303 | 67811 | 16/21 | 9 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 25439 | 3540 | 3896 | OoT | 1/1 | 16 | RLL+AntiSAT | 22510 | 3218 | 3302 | OoT | 15/24 | 15 |
| | MCM-MUL | Decoy [17] | 24867 | 3322 | 3569 | 83952 | 26/32 | 10 | RLL+CASLock | 22461 | 3337 | 3320 | OoT | 7/8 | 14 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 25139 | 3346 | 3562 | OoT | 1/1 | 15 | RLL+SARLock | 22425 | 3183 | 3303 | OoT | 31/41 | 14 |
| | MCM-SA | Constant [9] | 27126 | 3240 | 3273 | 51973 | 21/32 | 11 | RLL+SFL | 22389 | 3116 | 3311 | OoT | 19/29 | 14 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 27433 | 3256 | 3290 | OoT | 1/1 | 17 | RLL+SKGlock | 22514 | 3186 | 3329 | OoT | 17/24 | 15 |
| Folded | TMCM-MUL | Decoy [17] | 9136 | 4785 | 869 | 7478 | 20/32 | 2 | RLL | 9183 | 4486 | 804 | 7845 | 15/18 | 3 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 9379 | 4665 | 933 | OoT | 2/2 | 3 | RLL+AntiSAT | 9235 | 4681 | 882 | OoT | 8/15 | 4 |
| | TMCM-SA | Decoy [17] | 9791 | 3758 | 1168 | 11895 | 18/32 | 2 | RLL+CASLock | 9237 | 4675 | 926 | OoT | 8/13 | 4 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 9966 | 3646 | 1236 | OoT | 9/13 | 3 | RLL+SARLock | 9235 | 4761 | 911 | OoT | 31/31 | 4 |
| | TMCM-CRK | Constant [9] | 9126 | 4328 | 870 | 5657 | 22/32 | 2 | RLL+SFL | 9222 | 4570 | 892 | OoT | 16/20 | 4 |
| | | Proposed Hybrid | 9356 | 4602 | 894 | OoT | 1/1 | 3 | RLL+SKGlock | 9288 | 4434 | 910 | OoT | 18/31 | 4 |



VI. DISCUSSION

The hybrid protection of digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters combines hardware and software techniques to enhance security and reliability. Security Enhancement Hardware techniques like adding redundancy or using error-detecting codes can make it harder for attackers to tamper with or inject malicious data into the filter. Software techniques such as encryption and integrity checks help in securing the data and ensuring that the filter operates correctly. Reliability Improvement Redundancy in hardware components can improve fault tolerance, ensuring that the filter continues to operate even if some components fail. Software measures like error detection and correction can help in identifying and correcting errors that may occur during filter operation. Performance Impact While the hybrid protection scheme enhances security and reliability, it may also introduce some performance overhead. The additional hardware components and software algorithms may increase the filter's complexity and computational requirements.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the hybrid protection of digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters offers a robust approach to enhancing security and reliability. By combining hardware and software techniques, this approach provides a comprehensive defense against attacks and faults, improving the overall performance of the filter system. While there may be some trade-offs in terms of complexity and computational overhead, the benefits of increased security and reliability outweigh these concerns. Further research and optimization of hybrid protection schemes are needed to maximize performance and ensure the continued effectiveness of FIR filters in digital signal processing applications.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to thank Nimisha Limaye and Satwik Patnaik for running our obfuscated designs on their tools and Mohammad Yasin, Leon Li, and Christian Pilato for fruitful discussions. The attacks were carried out in the High Performance Computing Centre of TalTech.

REFERENCES

- 1) Bhadviya, Shruti; Rao, Vinita Kunwar; Suhalka, Riya; Tailor, Ritik; vyas, Manish; paliwal, Suraj (2023) "Smart Prepaid Energy Meter" in International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science . 2022 Special Issue, Vol. 13, p83-86. 4p.
- 2) E. Kaliappan; D. Fathema Farzana; B. Ponkarthika; G. Vignesh; T. Kesavan; T. Abhishek (2023). IOT Based Smart Prepaid Energy Recharge Scheme for EB.
- 3) S. Rathee, A. Goyal, and A. Shukla, "Designing Prepaid Smart Energy Meter and Deployment in a Network," in Proceedings of 2020 IEEE 4th Information Technology, Networking, Electronic and Automation Control Conference, ITNEC 2023, 2020, pp.1208–1211, doi:10.1109/ITNEC48623.2020.9084833.
- 4) C. Santhosh, S. V. Aswin Kumer, J. Gopi Krishna, M. Vaishnavi, P. Sairam, and P. Kasulu, "IoT based smart energy meter using GSM," Mater. Today Proc., vol. 46, no. xxxx, pp. 4122–4124, 2020, doi: 10.1016/j.matpr.2021.02.641.
- 5) Z. Arifin, M. Safi'I, W. H. Pamungkas, and Y. Servanda, "The Application of Smart Home System to Manage Electric Prepaid Type R1 KWH Meter Using Lattepanda Single Board Computer," in Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 2021, vol. 1807, no. 1, doi: 10.1088/1742-6596/1807/1/012024.
- 6) Defence Science Board Task Force. (2015, February) On High Performance Microchip Supply Chain. [Online]. Available: <https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA435563.pdf>
- 7) S. Amir, B. Shakya, D. Forte, M. Tehranipoor, and S. Bhunia, "Comparative Analysis of Hardware Obfuscation for IP Protection," in GLSVLSI, 2017, pp. 363–368.
- 8) A. B. Kahng, J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, S. Mantik, I. L. Markov, M. Potkonjak, P. Tucker, H. Wang, and G. Wolfe, "Watermarking Techniques for Intellectual Property Protection," in DAC, 1998, pp. 776–781.
- 9) Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, "Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention and



- 10) Digital Right Management,” in ICCAD,2007, pp. 674–677.
- 11) F. Koushanfar, “Provably Secure Active IC Metering Techniques for Piracy Avoidance and Digital Rights Management,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 51–63, 2012.



INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
SERIAL
NUMBER
INDIA



INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE RESEARCH

IN COMPUTER & COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING

 9940 572 462  6381 907 438  ijircce@gmail.com



www.ijircce.com

Scan to save the contact details